“SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE ITALO-ETHIOPIAN WAR
OF 1935-36”
in progress
Chapter in forthcoming book on the
Italo-Ethiopian War
Edited by Robert Mallett, Steven, Morewood
and Bruce Strang
Published by Palgrave MacMillan
J. Calvitt Clarke III, Ph.D.
Early
Soviet Interests in Ethiopia
In the twentieth century, events in the Third World have impacted
the more developed countries, which, in turn, have interjected themselves into
these local affairs for their own reasons.
The results have seldom been benign.
As one example, in 1935 and 6, Italy invaded, conquered, occupied, and
thoroughly abused Ethiopia. The events
swirling around the Italo-Ethiopian War helped forge the international
combinations that went to war after 1939—much as the exiled Lev Trotsky had
predicted they would. Many have written
on the Italo-Ethiopian War, most of them centering on Italy, Britain, France,
the League of Nations, and even the United States. The historiography has not served the other powers so well.
Historians have also misunderstood much. On the one hand, it is possible to write a valid history of the
Ethiopian Crisis without mentioning the Soviet Union except tangentially and
only after September 1935. Others have
asserted the USSR’s central role in the unfolding conflict.
Soviet
Efforts to Expand Its Interests in Ethiopia
The truth is complex.
State interests, communist ideology, and legacies of earlier
Italo-Russian confrontation in Northeast Africa whipsawed Soviet policy. Russia’s imperial efforts in the region had
fallen within the pale of European power politics, and the Soviet government
suckled the milk of tsarist experience.
For both the tsars and commissars, state interests predominated. Ideology legitimized realpolitik and reassured Russia’s leaders that in pursuing state
interests they also were marching in step with history’s inevitable tune.
Soviet
Hopes for Collective Security with Italy in Asia and Africa
Communist Russia used the Japanese threat in Ethiopia to justify
Fascism’s military preparations as legitimately defending Europe and
Africa. Other than Great Britain, Italy
was the sole power that could directly face the Soviets’ two enemies, Japan in
China and Germany in Austria. And
Moscow could not count on Britain, unlike Italy, to risk for long the
diplomatic quicksands of southeastern Europe.
Although the Kremlin could not suppose that Italy’s navy could threaten
the Japanese in the Pacific, if Rome and London could cooperate, Italy could
patrol the Mediterranean. Britain,
freed from that chore, could then more effectively oppose Japan in the Indian
and Pacific oceans.
1933 was a busy year for Moscow’s relations with Rome and for its
newly declared policy of collective security to contain both Nazi Germany and
the Japanese. A series of military
exchanges and favorable press comment punctuated their friendship. After signing an economic accord in May 1933
and a treaty of friendship in September, Litvinov consummated rapprochement
with a visit to Rome in December. Some
in Italy characterized Litvinov’s trip as part of a vast European solidarity
facing Japan.
Confirming the Soviet position, in mid-May 1935 when Mussolini
complained about the hostility of the Soviet press over Ethiopia, Ambassador
Boris Shtein denied any official antagonism:
“It is something which does not regard Russia,” he said.
Soviet
Hopes for Collective Security with Italy in Europe
For Moscow, collective security in Europe was to ensnare Germany by stitching together a net comprising France, Italy, and their allies in Eastern Europe—Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia on the one hand, and Austria and Hungary on the other. In mid-1934, Shtein assured Rome that the USSR wanted to see France and Italy solve their problems as part of the Soviet rapprochement with France and the Little Entente. If Moscow could bring Rome and Paris together, then France’s allies in the Little Entente would cooperate with Italy’s allies. This grouping would encircle Germany and stop the Nazis in their aggressive tracks by preventing Anschluss against Austria. France and Italy worked toward these goals in the Rome Accords of January 1935. Britain joined them in the Stresa Agreements of April. With the Italo-Soviet agreements of 1933, Soviet entry into the League of Nations in 1934, and the Franco-Soviet and Czecho-Soviet pacts of 1935, the Rome and Stresa agreements formed more bricks in the wall Moscow wanted raised against German expansion. In exchange for his participation in collective security, however, Mussolini demanded and received concessions in Africa.
Italy’s ambassador from Moscow sympathetically noted that for some
time the Kremlin had maintained reserve toward the brewing Italo-Ethiopian
conflict. According to their communist
verbiage and ideology, he continued, the Soviets should have been enjoying the
fight of a colonial people against a great power. But they were not.
Collective
Security Excludes Ethiopia
In truth, Moscow’s inaction toward the Italo-Ethiopian conflict
had become obvious. Litvinov, as
president of the Eighty-Sixth Session of the League’s Council and Assembly
sessions, in May carefully avoided any statement condemning aggression
committed by League members.
In late June, Shtein again reassured Rome that the USSR did not
intend to interfere in Italy’s plans for East Africa; Moscow only wanted that
Italy avoid war. In mid-July, Shtein
explained that his government had rejected requests to send arms to
Ethiopia. Tokyo meanwhile blamed rumors
of excessive Japanese interference in Ethiopia on Soviet sources.
Giving force to Italy’s new role as a
defender of the status quo against Germany, Mussolini promised a “million
bayonets.” By the end of June, Rome and
Paris had signed a pact for military cooperation on Austria. The French army began planning to withdraw
seventeen divisions from southeast France and North Africa to reposition them
above the Maginot Line against Germany.
The Kremlin had good reason in the summer of 1935 to hope that
collective security could continue to work as it had in the summer before. Then Italy had moved its troops to the
Brenner Pass and had forced Germany to back down from its attempted coup to
impose Anschluss on Austria.
Reflecting realpolitik, behind the closed doors of the
League Council Litvinov pressed hard to settle the brewing conflict to Italy’s
benefit. Among other favors, when told
that London wanted a Council meeting to discuss the dispute, the commissar
directed Shtein to warn Italy and to suggest that Rome seek a delay, which he
would support. The Japanese
ambassador in Rome grasped this reality.
He reported to Tokyo that Litvinov was hesitating to discuss the
Italo-Ethiopian conflict in the League Council because of worsening relations
between Italy and Japan.
A series of economic negotiations also showed the Kremlin’s desire
not to let increasing tensions over Ethiopia interrupt good relations with
Rome. In December 1934, the Soviets
signed an agreement prolonging their trade protocol. Six months later, Mussolini and Shtein signed a new agreement for
export credits. After the outbreak of
war in Ethiopia, the two states signed agreements to provide petroleum products
and payment for purchases.
The Kremlin decided to pay the price necessary to keep Italy on
the Brenner. In August, Shtein again begged
Rome to consider Litvinov’s most difficult position. Litvinov wanted to do all possible to help Italy. The greatest problem was Italy’s declaration
to take Ethiopia at any cost. If Italy
could carry off its aggression without calling it “aggression,” Moscow would be
content to see Italy satisfied, and a cooperative Mussolini could win from the
League all he wanted. Shtein made clear
the Kremlin’s belief that the League’s position depended on a self-serving
Britain determined to make problems for Italy.
Britain did fear Italy’s pressure on its imperial holdings, and
London also dismissed Italy’s ability to counter the Hitlerite threat. The Stresa Front with its implicit Soviet
connection crumbled after Britain concluded the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in
June behind the backs of its Stresa partners.
The
Soviets Change Their View of Collective Security
Was Italy or Britain in the end more useful to Moscow in opposing
Germany and Japan? The Soviets had to
ask, and the answer was obvious. London
sucked both Paris and Moscow into the vortex of anti-Italian, League action.
At the League Council’s September 5 meeting, Litvinov unexpectedly
condemned Italian aggression. Even then
reticent, his reserve clearly voiced Soviet concerns. He valued Italian friendship and wanted to keep it; the
Italo-Ethiopian dispute in itself did not bother the Soviets except that it
portended threats by Japan and Germany, and Italy was a vital part of
collective security. But, it was
collective security itself that was now threatened.
Most then and now have misinterpreted Litvinov’s speech as hostile
to Italy, and Rome itself called the statement “a grave blow” to
friendship. On the surface, violently
anti-Italian, in truth it was a plea for continued cooperation. Some Italians did recognize the ambivalence
in the Kremlin’s position. Pietro
Arone, the newly-arrived ambassador to Moscow, described Moscow’s cynicism
toward the League’s ability to do anything effective.
Again placing the Italo-Ethiopian conflict within the larger
context of collective security, on September 14, Litvinov complained to the
League, saying: “If we had before us from Italy, instead of a declaration on
liberty of action, a formal . . . complaint against acts of aggression
committed by a neighboring Ethiopia . . . Italy would have obtained from the
League full justice . . . [and] the sympathy to which the noble Italian nation
is entitled.” In other words, if Italy
had but presented its case differently, then both the League and Moscow would
have accepted Rome’s claims.
Litvinov’s
speech remarkably blended a Marxist outlook with the dictates of Soviet
expediency needing peace. It stressed
Soviet admiration for the League as an instrument to stalemate aggressive
states, and the Kremlin’s efforts to make it an effective instrument. But again, most impressive about this
statement was its mildness, its desire to put off when the Soviets would have
to condemn directly, and on its own terms, Italian aggression in Ethiopia. They clearly were more interested in
potential aggression elsewhere, that is, Germany and Japan against the Soviet
Union itself.
Italy finally
attacked Ethiopia on October 3.
The Kremlin by November 14
had put all League sanctions proposals into force. Replying to an Italian note, Litvinov lectured Italy on
League-members’ duties under Article 16. He stressed that all states, Ethiopia included, enjoyed equal
rights with all other League members.
He then concluded that collective security was essential for preserving peace.
On the 18th, the economic and financial sanctions adopted by the
League against Italy came into full effect.
Four days
later, Litvinov assured Arone that Russia did not bear Italy any
hostility. Soviet Russia had, he said,
“not the slightest interest in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. . . ,” but was
concerned for the precedent against collective security if Italy got off
without punishment.
Sanctions
and the Soviet Union
Once unhappily drawn into
anti-Italian action, they vocally supported the victim of aggression in
the League. Soviet officials consistently pleaded for stronger measures
against Italy. They warned that
sanctions had to work, because more serious threats to world peace lurked on
the horizon.
But, the Soviet state also
expressed ambivalence. Cautious in
their timing, the Soviets delivered five major speeches about the war either to
support decisions already reached or to criticize plans that had already
failed. They made the first three after
firm declarations by Britain and France.
The last two were post mortems
which allowed Russia to stress the need for collective security while causing
Italy minimum irritation.
In the face of these seeming inconsistencies, many have long
argued over Soviet fidelity to their own exhortations. Some have contended that while loudly and
hypocritically denouncing Italy at Geneva for unprovoked aggression, Moscow was
pumping vast supplies of raw materials into Mussolini’s war machine.
The oil question sparked the most persistent rumors of Soviet
infidelity toward League sanctions. In
early 1936, stories of huge oil shipments to Italy mushroomed, and the League’s
trade statistics revealed that the Soviets had increased their oil shipments to
Italy during January and February 1936.
On the other hand, oil shipments in early 1936 never reached one third
of the average monthly exports of the year before.
The total Soviet trade picture, however, shows something
different. While Moscow applied
sanctions to enumerated goods, it carried on a lively export trade in
unenumerated items. The Soviet Union
maintained 83.5 percent of this trade with Italy, a much higher percentage than
did others. The Soviets could preserve
this level, because sanctions hit them lightly. Of the twenty-four commodities on the League questionnaire, only
three Soviet export products were affected—iron ore, manganese, and
chromium—and the Soviets immediately cut off shipments of all three. As compensation, they expanded shipments of
unenumerated commodities, for example oats, phosphates, wood, and pig iron.
Soviet trade during sanctions fit perfectly into Moscow’s larger
diplomatic objectives. The Kremlin had
to bow toward Britain’s superior weight in any possible scheme of collective
security by adhering faithfully to the black letter of sanctions. At the same time, the Soviets sought to keep
as many contacts with Italy as possible so that when the war was over,
friendship and Italy’s crucial station in collective security could be
restored.
At
War’s End
A mere
half-a-year or so after Italy’s invasion, the League Council met in April 1936
under the dark shadow of Ethiopia’s impending collapse. Moscow indignantly blamed the failure of
sanctions on the reluctance to make common cause against aggression. The Journal de Moscou
offered a parable: “If flames are
destroying a little house and sparks are falling on the roof of a big house . .
. firemen should not waste time on the doomed house but rush to the big one
while there is still a chance to save it.” Clearly, the Soviets remained more concerned about Germany and
Japan than they were about Ethiopia.
The Soviets did not object to Italy’s annexation of Ethiopia and offered to remove their sanctions if Italy would join an accord with themselves and Paris to prevent future aggression. Mussolini ultimately rejected the idea. Even then, Litvinov could still say that for a brief while “the principle of collective security” had drown “the voice of friendship.” The “peoples of the Soviet Union cherish nothing but the greatest respect and sympathy for the Italian people. They are interested in the uninterrupted development and consolidation of their existing political, economic, and cultural relations.” Meanwhile, as the League abandoned sanctions, the onset of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936 dashed Moscow’s efforts at reconciliation. Soviet appeasement had failed.