THE POLITICS OF ARMS NOT GIVEN:
JAPAN, ETHIOPIA, AND ITALY IN THE 1930s
Paper presented to the
Annual meeting of the
Florida Conference of Historians
Tallahassee, FL, Mar. 2001.
J. Calvitt Clarke III
Jacksonville University
http://users.ju.edu/jclarke/wizzat.html
This is a condensed version of “The Politics of Arms Not Given: Japan,
Ethiopia, and Italy in the 1930s.” In Girding for Battle: The Arms Trade in
a Global Perspective, 1815-1940. Edited by Donald J. Stoker Jr. and
Jonathan A. Grant. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.
Independent states
enter the international arms trade and engage in military exchanges for many
reasons. Receiver states wish to get the material resources and training to
beat an enemy on the battlefield, or at least to withstand his onslaught, or to
intimidate him to the point of avoiding conflict. Donor states, on the other
hand, might wish merely to improve their international balance of trade
statistics. Certainly, they use arms deliveries and military exchanges to
wrench political influence within a target state. Military connections become
powerful, public statements of patron-client relationships jealously sought,
defended, and resisted in the Darwinist struggle for survival of the fittest
among nations. Receiver states often must try to preserve their sovereignty by
using military exchanges to balance the designs of more powerful and predatory
nations.
The relationships among Italy, Ethiopia, and Japan in the early 1930s amply
show the profound political impact of actual—and even rumored—military
connections in international affairs.
Italy's Problem: Real and Imagined
Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, and Italy signed the Paris Arms Treaty in
August 1930. Italy’s Duce, Benito Mussolini, believed that he now had the right
to act as Ethiopia's military patron. Spurning Italy's exclusive patronage,
however, the Ethiopians looked elsewhere, most importantly engaging a small
Belgian military mission to train and organize their army.
At the same time and halfway around the world, Japan’s ultra-nationalists
wished to lead an alliance of the "colored peoples" of the world.
Ethiopia, they thought, would play a crucial role in that alliance. Japan's
penetration of Ethiopia therefore particularly galled Italy. Italian
newspapers—with newspapers and officials the world over chiming in—excitedly
and falsely reported that many Japanese officers had replaced the Belgians in
instructing and reorganizing Ethiopia's troops.
Blattengeta Heruy Welde Sellase's Mission to Japan: The Possibilities
Following the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Japan and
Ethiopia in 1930, Foreign Minister Heruy Welde Sellase's mission to Japan in
1931 dramatized the potentialities—including military—of Ethio-Japanese
cooperation. Everywhere in Japan, Heruy received an enthusiastic reception. In
an audience with Emperor Hirohito, he confirmed Japan as Ethiopia's choice as
the model for modernization. Heruy and his party met officials and businessmen,
visited shrines and tourist attractions, tarried at chambers of commerce and
geisha houses, and reveled at banquets and hunting parties. Many of the
manufacturing concerns he visited held obvious military implications. He
observed inter-divisional maneuvers. Admiring Japan's well-disciplined
soldiers, Heruy decided to begin Japanizing Ethiopia's troops by adopting
Japanese-styled military uniforms. After studying samples, he informally
contracted two spinning companies to supply cloth for uniforms.
Heruy's visit, which lasted until December 1931, held important consequences.
For Japan, it visibly raised Ethio-Japanese relations to their zenith and
encouraged widespread public support for Ethiopia as that country girded for
war a few years later in 1935. Japan's pan-Asianists began to see Ethiopia as a
country where they could put their ideals into practice—including expanding
Japan's economic and "civilizing" influence. On the Ethiopian side,
Heruy’s journey spurred hopes that Japan’s support might balance Italy’s
increasing weight in their country. Heruy sought arms and munitions. At that
time, however, Japan was dealing with the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident
and had worries other than supplying arms to Ethiopia.
As if to highlight to a concerned world the possibility of a Japanese stamp on
Ethiopia's modernization process, in 1934 two Japanese gunboats sailed into
Djibouti, the best maritime door to Ethiopia.
Tsuchida Yutaka's Inspection Tour to Ethiopia, June 1934: More Possibilities
Emboldened by the commercial agreement of 1930 and Heruy's visit, several shady
Japanese had visited Ethiopia pushing their sundry schemes. Concerned with the
negative foreign reaction to Japan's inroads into Ethiopia and with these
unofficial visitors, Tokyo sent Tsuchida Yutaka on an inspection tour of
Ethiopia in 1934. Wanting to protect Ethiopia's independence from the
imperialist predations of Britain, France, and Italy, Tsuchida was optimistic
about commercial opportunities. He felt, however, that Japan, far from
Ethiopia, could not support imperialist ambitions there.
For their part, the Ethiopians had more than general economic development in
mind. Emperor Hayle Sellase apparently had asked for prices on Japanese
munitions, and Heruy officially placed with Tsuchida an order for 7,000
infantry rifles, 3,000 cavalry rifles, 350 light machine guns, and 48 heavy
machine guns. Heruy also proposed that Ethiopia send ten pilots to Japan for
training and that Japan build a munitions factory in Ethiopia.
Nothing practical resulted from Tsuchida’s visit.
Rumor and Reality: Japanese Arms to Ethiopia and Ambassador Sugimura Yotaro
On December 5, 1934, the Wal Wal incident broke into the world’s headlines. Wal
Wal was an important watering hole sixty miles inside Ethiopia's border, where
Italian and Ethiopian troops fired on each other. Mussolini chose to make the
affair a causus belli by demanding unacceptable reparations. Moreover,
as part of this campaign, Italy’s Duce cited the Yellow Peril and merged his
wrath toward Ethiopia with his suspicions toward Japan.
In his meeting on December 23, 1934 with Japan's newly appointed ambassador to
Rome, Sugimura Yotaro, Mussolini complained that Japan was actively supplying
weapons to Ethiopia. As instructed, Sugimura replied that Japan had no
political ambitions in there. This meeting marked the beginning of Sugimura's
assiduous efforts to placate Italy on Ethiopia as well as to dampen his own
country's ultra-nationalists.
The next day, Ethiopia’s chargé d'affaires at Rome visited Sugimura to request
military aid. Again, the ambassador explained he had no authority to commit
Japan to providing weapons to Ethiopia.
In the face of Italy's military buildup in early 1935, Ethiopia swore its
peaceful intentions toward Italy. A spokesman specifically denied rumors of
superseding the Belgian military instructors with a Japanese mission. More
denials in March, however, did little to quell the international excitement.
The Italian and Soviet presses in July falsely accused Japan of long supplying
arms to Ethiopia.
Making Sugimura’s job more difficult, the Italo-Ethiopian conflict was breaking
into international headlines just when tensions between the "Control
Faction" and the "Imperial Way Faction" in the Japanese Army
were boiling over. The pragmatists who comprised the Control Faction favored a
cautious foreign policy and wary concern for the Great Powers. The
ultra-nationalists of the Imperial Way Faction, on the other hand, called for a
more assertive, independent, and pan-Asiatic foreign policy. These patriots
eagerly cultivated relations with non-European powers and wished to join with
oppressed masses to overcome the white man’s domination.
For his part,
Sugimura criticized Japanese attitudes toward Italy. He clearly thrust realpolitik
to the fore:
Based especially on its racial concerns, (he said) Japanese public
opinion naturally sympathizes with a weak country and tries to help Ethiopia.
Japanese military and political power is not as strong in faraway Africa as in
East Asia. It is unwise to stiffen Japan's attitude toward Italy by reserving
its right to speak out in the future and by asserting its right to supply
weapons and ammunition. Moreover, it sounds fine, but it is not wise to try to
extend our commercial rights based on the racial argument, which directly puts
us into confrontation with England, France, and Italy.
Italy's ambassador
at Tokyo spoke on July 20 with Japan’s vice foreign minister. The latter denied any knowledge of Japan's
sending arms to Ethiopia—but he pointedly added that Japan had a right to send
weapons to Ethiopia just as Italy was sending weapons to China—an especially
sore point with the Japanese.
In early August
1935, Italy again inserted the racial argument into the armaments discussion,
claiming that certain European states were betraying white civilization by
supplying arms to Ethiopia. Such hyperventilated
worries, however, over weapons, military advisers, and volunteers going to
Ethiopia from Japan, had no basis in reality.
On August 2,
Ethiopia’s representative in Italy asked Japan’s ambassador for help. Revealing
his despair, he even suggested that Japan send submarines to sink Italian ships
supporting Mussolini's military buildup in East Africa! He pleaded that if this
aid was not possible, Japan should at least officially support Ethiopia. The
Japanese ambassador refused to give any assurances on such delicate matters.
Putting an
exclamation point to this judicious response, a high Japanese official publicly
asserted on August 6, that its own army program and mission in East Asia made
it unthinkable that Japan could divert munitions stocks to Ethiopia. That same day, Ethiopia's foreign ministry formally denied rumors that
a Japanese military mission would visit Addis Ababa and that Japan was
supplying arms to Ethiopia. Hayle Sellase himself publicly declared that
Ethiopia had not received any assurance of Japanese support. Ever paranoid,
Rome feared that this statement did not reject an arms deal in the future.
On August 8,
Japanese officials—again—denied reports of backing to Ethiopia. That same day,
Ethiopia's minister in London visited Japan's chargé and asked about reports
that Japan had exported many weapons to Ethiopia. When told that the
information was false, the disappointed minister nonetheless expressed
gratitude for the sympathy the Japanese people had shown Ethiopia.
Ever willing to
provoke animosity toward Japan—and with no real evidence—on August 26, the
Soviet press asserted that Japanese military deliveries had increased during
the previous six months. The Japanese were paying particular attention to
Ethiopia's aviation and were helping in its organization. In the likely event
of an Italo-Ethiopian war, Japan would supply Ethiopia with more arms and ammunition.
The New York Times meanwhile reported that the Ethiopians had arranged
with Japan arms shipments enough to meet their needs for six months. These arms
included rifles, machine guns, revolvers, and ammunition. Japanese were
enlisting for Ethiopia. Ethiopians believed that Italy had raised the Japanese
threat to justify its aggression against Ethiopia. The Japanese had concluded
that all this was propaganda by the British, French, and others designed to
help Italy protect a white stronghold.
On August 29,
Tokyo officially denied once more that Ethiopia had ordered any munitions from
Japan. Japan had neither sent nor would send arms or ammunition to Ethiopia and
would continue its watchful waiting.
Ethiopia's
Last Gasp: Daba Birrou's Visit to Japan, 1935
To secure the
credits and arms he wanted, in late summer Hayle Sellase sent Daba Birrou, the
director of the national military academy, on a mission to Japan. Daba Birrou
requested military officers, engineers, 24 heavy machine guns, 200 light
machine guns, 12 cannons, 1000 cartridges, anti-aircraft weapons, 5000 rifles,
sound locators, army tents, and medical equipment. To his disappointment, the
Japanese repeated their official position, one of watchful waiting and
protection of Japan's commercial interests—interests not terribly large in any
case.
Despite
official reticence, Daba Birrou's visit sparked as much public excitement in
Japan as had Heruy's four years earlier. About 2,000 members of diverse
patriotic, ultra-nationalist, and pan-Asianist organizations on September 19
welcomed Daba Birrou at the Tokyo station. They carried banners screaming,
"Down With Italy!" and "Rescue Ethiopia!" Ethiopia's
honorary consulate in Osaka began receiving applications from Japanese wanting
to volunteer to fight for Ethiopia. Daba Birrou received many invitations to
events from ultra-nationalist organizations.
On September
21, the Ethiopian Problems Society held a welcoming party for Daba Birrou. He
thanked these ultra-patriots for their passionate sympathy. Western newspapers
snidely pointed out that Daba Birrou, "young, coal-black, and
English-speaking," appeared dazed by ample handshaking by elderly
patriots; he had not realized that no Japanese of importance was present.
While such
lavish expressions of Japanese public opinion fed suspicions among the Western
powers, government policy was more hardheaded. Both the foreign ministry and
Imperial Army had rejected giving any military aid. Fearing larger diplomatic
repercussions and Ethiopia's inability to pay, Japan sent Ethiopia neither
arms, nor munitions, nor a mission. The Japanese limited their aid during the
Italo-Ethiopian War to sending the Ethiopian Red Cross enough plasters for
10,000 people, 138 boxes of medical supplies, and some tents. With most of the
rest of the world, Japan protested Italy's use of poison gas and its bombing of
Red Cross units.
Conclusion
Despite the
fervent flattery from patriotic Japanese and tepid support to Ethiopia's Red
Cross, in the end the Ethiopians got none of the significant aid they had hoped
to get from Japan. Ethiopia’s army was neither sufficiently armed, trained, nor
led to effectively resist for long Italy’s invasion. Italian troops entered
Addis Ababa in May 1936.
At the crucial
moment during the Italo-Ethiopian War, in February 1936, young Imperial Way
Faction army officers attempted a coup by occupying the Diet Building and the
War Ministry in Tokyo and assassinating high officials. The coup's failure
strengthened the Control Faction, which clamped down on those ultra-nationalist
groups that had also tended most vociferously to support Ethiopia. One result
of the pragmatists’ victory was that Japan's government eventually accommodated
itself to Italy's conquest of the Ethiopian Empire. The exchange of recognitions
on December 2, 1936—Japan's conquest of Manchukuo for Italy's conquest of
Ethiopia—paved the way for the reconciliation between Tokyo and Rome.
Surely, Rome
and Tokyo could not have performed this volte-face so quickly if the Italians
had not come to believe Japanese protestations of innocence about the arms
transfers and training that Ethiopia had so desperately needed. Perhaps they
never truly had. But whether they had or not, they had effectively used the
rumors of significant Japanese inroads into Ethiopia to disarm potential
international opposition to Italy’s coming adventure, especially in London,
Paris, and Moscow.
The remnants of the patriotic, pro-Ethiopian groups in Japan came to strongly
support the Axis alliance that went to war during World War II. This wartime
coalition ultimately led to mutual devastation and defeat for both Italy and
Japan. Ethiopia, on the other hand, in 1941 became the first Axis-occupied
country to be liberated.