Geoffrey Roberts. The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933-1941. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. x, 192 pp. $69.95/$19.95.

http://users.ju.edu/jclarke/wizzn.html

In his Unholy Alliance (1989) and subsequent articles, Geoffrey Roberts has forcefully argued that the Soviet push in the 1930s for Collective Security was consistent, constant, and sincere, however burdened it may have been by indecision, drift, and confusion in tactical aims and methods. He has picked up his cudgel again and wields it skillfully.

Not breaking new ground, Roberts' latest book, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War, unabashedly rehashes his earlier work, including Unholy Alliance and articles in Soviet Studies (1992), Journal of Contemporary History (1992), Historical Journal (1992), Diplomacy and Statecraft (1993), and International History Review (1994). This new work marks Roberts' attempt to draw together a systematic view of Russo-German relations during the eight years from 1933 to 1941. A work of interpretation, he creates a sustained, and generally convincing, argument, the heart of which is:
What all this amounted to was a relatively open and indeterminate policy towards Nazi Germany, a policy with two faces: a strategic face of opposition, confrontation and containment and a tactical face of coexistence and compromise (p. 26).

Roberts begins his well-written book with a strong historiographical chapter—one of his consistent strengths. In the subsequent eight chapters, he chronologically marches through the critical events that lead from the end of Rapallo, through the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and ultimately to the German attack on the USSR in 1941.

Whatever debates there were inside the Kremlin, and Roberts discusses them to the limits published documents allow, he emphasizes that all in the Soviet leadership understood the implacable hostility the Nazis held for Russia and communism. Roberts summarizes his Unholy Alliance to explain that the Soviets decided to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939 only after being convinced of the futility of continuing to pursue collective security with Britain and France. He convincingly explains the defensive nature of Soviet policy between 1939 and 1941, as well as how the Soviet leadership allowed themselves to be surprised by the German attack on June 22, 1941.

If there is a weakness in this short book, it lies on his use—or lack of—the latest bibliography. While he often cites recent works, it is not always clear that he has yet to integrate them critically into his vision.

As in his earlier endeavors, Roberts has relied on published works, both Russian-published documents and the efforts of Russian and Western historians who have toiled in the archives. We can hope that Roberts himself will soon venture to those archives to see how much, if any, that exposure changes his vision. The resulting work would be provocative and important.

J. Calvitt Clarke III
Jacksonville University

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