ITALO-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONS IN 1933 AND 1934
MANIFESTATIONS OF CORDIALITY
Paper Presented to the Duquesne History Forum
Pittsburgh, PA
October 27, 1988
by
J. Calvitt Clarke III
http//users.ju.edu/jclarke/wizzp.html
The years 1933 and 1934 were critical ones
for European diplomacy, as statesmen groped to divine precisely what Hitler
represented and how best to deal with him and his resurgent Germany. In the
ensuing welter of diplomatic initiatives, one intriguing, and insufficiently
studied, response was the Italo-Soviet rapprochement, which peaked with their
economic accord of May 1933 and their "Pact of Friendship, Neutrality, and
Nonaggression" of September. The progress of this increasing cordiality can be
measured by the extensive military cooperation, which simultaneously developed
between the Fascist, and Soviet states. In the stylized and ritualized theater
of diplomacy, both consciously used military contacts to encourage further
cooperative steps and to prove to the world and to themselves that what was
happening was important.
EXCHANGES OF VISITS BY NAVAL AND AIR UNITS AND MILITARY ATTACHES
ITALIAN SUBMARINE VISIT TO BATUM, MAY 1933
Following up and symbolizing the Italo-Soviet economic accord of May 6, which
further developed the traditionally satisfactory commercial relations between
the two states, two Italian submarines, the Tricheco and Delfino,
called on the Soviet Black Sea port of Batum late in the month. This, as TASS
pointed out, marked the first visit of foreign submarines to the USSR—just as
four years earlier, Italo Balbo's flight to Odessa had been the first visit of
military aircraft. The Italian ambassador to the Kremlin, Bernardo Attolico,
the military attaché Lt. Col. Aldo de Ferrari, the Italian consul at Tiflis,
and the submarine captains met Soviet naval commanders and were treated to
banquets and tours. The Italians reciprocated with a reception of their own
and visits to the submarines. The first foreigners to be so honored, Attolico
and de Ferrari went aboard the modern Soviet cruiser, Krasnyi Kavkaz,
which, having been built completely in the yards at Novorossiisk, was the
pride of the Red Navy.
Early the morning of May 27, the submarines put to sea. That same day Attolico
and de Ferrari boarded the steamer Armenia bound for Odessa, where they
arrived three days later to be met by a foreign commissariat official and the
Italian consul general. At Sevastopol, they honored the fallen of the Crimean
War and visited factories and a sovkhoz. For the benefit of the press,
Attolico found time to praise Soviet hospitality, industry, and agriculture,
as well as Italo-Soviet economic cooperation. Noting that Odessa was the most
important maritime center on the Black Sea, the ambassador added that the
recent economic accord had extended the jurisdiction of the consulate general
in Odessa to other Black Sea ports.
The next stop was Kiev, whence the Italians departed for Moscow on June 1. In
his report describing the tour, the Italian military attaché lauded Soviet
hospitality and naval construction. Although no untoward incidents had marred
the trip, he and Attolico did note the incredible misery in the Crimea and
Ukraine. They, for example, passed on the claim by the German consul that 147
mothers had been imprisoned for eating their own children. The horror of this
self-imposed suffering did not, however, prompt Rome's representatives to
suggest that the Soviet Union was in any way an unfit partner for Italy.
THE EXCHANGES CONTINUE, AUTUMN 1933
During August, as the final touches were being negotiated for the Pact of
Friendship, Neutrality, and Nonaggression, Moscow several times asked Rome to
exchange observers to army and naval maneuvers, and expressed a desire to send
part of the Black Sea fleet to Italy in the near future to repay Rome for the
recent submarine visit. Celebrating the pact's signing on September 2, Soviet
papers rejoiced that Italian Fascism differed from German Nazism, and they
assured their readers that ideology need not get in the way of the growing
friendship between Rome and Moscow. To drive home the point, a Soviet military
mission visited Italy early that month, and on the occasion of its return to
the USSR, Izvestia published the Kremlin's thanks for the "exceptional
courtesy given the mission by the military authorities and by the Italian
government." Before the end of the month, an Italian mission, which included a
brigadier general, arrived in Moscow for a fortnight's fêting and touring. The
prospects for closer military and political collaboration sharply escalated.
SOVIET NAVAL VISIT TO NAPLES, OCTOBER 1933
While on his way home from Washington in early December 1933, Foreign
Commissar Maksim Litvinov stopped off in Rome to bask in the warmth of his
recent successes: US recognition of the USSR and the conclusion of the
Italo-Soviet pact. Anticipating the visit, three Soviet vessels, the cruiser
Krasnyi Kavkaz and the destroyers Petrovskii and Shaumian,
left Sevastopol on October 17 to arrive in Naples thirteen days later. To
dramatize the visit, the Soviets asked that the captains be allowed to call
upon Mussolini in Rome. Apparently, they did not go to Rome during their brief
three-day stay, but otherwise they and their crews were amply celebrated and
dined, and they toured shipyards, Mt. Vesuvius, and the ruins at Pompeii.
Krasnyi Kavkaz
Only two small problems arose. The Società
Rimorchiatori Napoletani had a small unpaid bill of 431.80 lire for work done
on the Soviet cruiser. A complaint to the Italian foreign ministry, which in
turn remonstrated to the Soviet embassy, quickly settled the dispute. The
other, even more trivial, affair concerned the Italian arrest of an
individual, born in St. Petersburg, who had tried to distribute anti-Bolshevik
propaganda to Soviet sailors in Naples. Neither of these petty incidents
detracted from the significance of the visit.
The Soviet press emphasized that the naval visit demonstrated the firm
friendship existing between Italian and Soviet military and civilian
authorities. For its part, the Italian press described the festivities without
political comment. Meanwhile in Berlin, Nazi authorities viewed these
developments with some concern; they noted reports that Moscow was
anticipating the visit of yet another Italian military delegation. Rome
duplicitously denied the allegation.
SOVIET FLIGHT TO ITALY, AUGUST 1934
After this first round of naval exchanges, some months passed before the tempo
picked up again. In July of 1934, just as Nazi activities were cresting and
breaking in Austria against Italian resistance, chemical warfare specialists
visited each other's facilities, and Attolico, somewhat prematurely, called
these military contacts a "tradition." Pushing for closer ties with Moscow, he
emphasized their political and military utility in promoting Rome's policies.
Quickly thereafter, three Soviet military aircraft visited Italy in official
repayment for Balbo's 1929 flight to Odessa. The planes left Kiev on August 6,
and flew to Rome by way of Odessa, Istanbul, and Athens. They carried
thirty-nine people and included high-ranking military figures and civilian
aviation technicians. These visitors were shown military and industrial
establishments by their hosts, who wished to secure contracts to supply the
USSR with military goods. On the hot afternoon of August 8, Mussolini, along
with General Valle and Undersecretary of State Fulvio Suvich, received the
Soviet mission in the Palazzo Venezia. After the Duce praised Russian
aviation, the Soviets shouted three "hurrahs." Demonstrating the growing
triangular cooperation between the USSR, Italy, and France, the planes flew on
to Paris from Rome. The Soviet press extolled the flight and attendant
ceremonies and stressed that the visit had proved the maturity of its air
industry and skills of its personnel and had reinforced the ties between
Soviet and Italian aviation. In a flight of hyperbole, the Soviets touted the
flight as having helped to consolidate universal peace.
EXCHANGES OF MILITARY OBSERVERS, 1934 AND 1935
These exchanges of 1934 culminated in the fall, when Moscow and Rome traded
observers to their annual military maneuvers. Hoping to encourage contracts to
supply the USSR with military goods, the Italians took the Soviet mission to
various military and industrial establishments. In return, Italian military
experts observed the maneuvers around Minsk from September 6 to the 10th.
Given "particular attention and honor" by the Soviets, the enormous progress
of the Red Army impressed the delegation. Ambassador Attolico accented again
the political importance of all these military contacts.
One year later, even as tensions were building over Italy's mobilization and
only seven weeks before its declaration of war against Abyssinia, an Italian
delegation attended important Soviet military maneuvers around Kiev from
September 12 to the 16th. Given the city's strategic sensitivity and that also
attending were observers from France and Czechoslovakia, countries with which
Moscow recently had signed mutual assistance pacts, the Italian chargé in
Moscow credited the Soviet invitation to Italy as having special political
significance. Headed by General Monti, the Italians saw heavily motorized
units, many planes, and 500 parachutists. After the exercise, they, along with
the French and Czechs, attended a reception. Later they visited a factory
complex and then went to Moscow, where they arrived on the 22nd to another
party with the French and Czech representatives.
NAVAL CONSTRUCTION
THE SOVIETS WANT ITALIAN HELP
Productive as these exchanges were, the Soviets wanted more. With the Second
Five Year Plan, Stalin sought foreign offers for naval machinery, armor plate,
heavy guns, and even complete battleships. Much of this outside help came from
Fascist Italy. In seeking Italian yards, designs, motors, armament, equipment,
and engineers—and in purchasing Italian ships—the Soviets were looking back on
similar purchases by their tsarist predecessors and on their own fruitful
collaboration in the twenties. But the key advantages were real, not historic.
Possessing a well-deserved reputation for warship design, Italy, with its
arsenal labor some 6 per cent cheaper than France's and cheaper also than
Britain's, was receiving a higher return for its naval expenditure than was
any other major power. Despite the depression racking other nations' yards,
Italian yards were keeping their labor in a higher state of efficiency by
regular work. Enviably, they were receiving even more foreign than domestic
orders, and, without labor discord, they contrasted strikingly with the
virtually idle French and British yards.
One of the features making this commercial nexus so attractive was that the
technical requirements of both navies were remarkably similar. Both operated
on closed, shallow, relatively sheltered seas, close to home ports, air
support, and repair and resupply facilities. Neither needed ships with long
cruising ranges or extreme endurance. This permitted high fuel-consuming
speed, increased maneuverability, reduced armor, and heavy guns requiring more
frequent replacement because of their heavier shells fired at higher muzzle
velocities. Additionally, although the Soviet Union, unlike Italy, had no
treaty displacement limitations on its warships, the relatively shallow depths
of the Baltic and Black seas limited permissible drafts just as effectively.
Historically, in any case, the Russian navy rarely had ventured great
distances from its own coastal waters.
ANSALDO OF GENOA
For political reasons the Kremlin did not want to have its ships built
entirely in foreign yards, and therefore the Soviets preferred to order
essential parts in Italy and assemble them in the USSR with Italian technical
assistance. Moscow's negotiations with Italian firms for the supply of
materials and expertise, despite the Italian government's help, were often
tedious. Overall, however, the contracts decided upon seem, in the end, to
have satisfied both sides in all regards—politically, economically, and
technologically.
Among the
firms working with Moscow, Ansaldo of Genoa proved the most active. It, for
example, built two escort warships designed to protect Soviet fishing smacks
in the Vladivostok area. As the two vessels neared completion in early 1934,
the questions of their transfer to Soviet nationality and their physical move
from Genoa to Vladivostok raised some minor legal and political obstacles.
Fearing that the trip would be politically more difficult under the Soviet
flag, Moscow wanted the ships to sail under the Italian mercantile flag with
Italian captains and crews; after all, the two ships would have to traverse
oceans controlled by the British and Japanese empires.
The problem was that, according to Italian maritime law, no foreign national
could fully own Italian-flagged commercial vessels unless he had resided in
the kingdom for at least five years; yet the ships, as property, would pass to
the ownership of the Soviet government upon their consignment in Genoa.
Desiring to accommodate the Soviet request, Rome batted the matter about. One
possible solution was to have an Italian consul at Vladivostok perform the
formalities of nationality transfer, but that would relieve the Soviet Union
of any financial/insurance responsibilities during the trip. Alternatively,
Ansaldo could consign the ship to the Soviet trade representative, who had
more than the five years' required residency. Mussolini, himself, ultimately
intervened to insure that the two ships were transferred according to Soviet
desires. And to get around the problem of a warship flying a mercantile flag,
he ordered the ships to sail unarmed to Vladivostok, their weapons and
munitions to be carried as cargo. For them, the Soviets owed Ansaldo more than
18 million lire, with payments spread over fifty-one months from the date of
consignment. The Italian government guaranteed payments to 65 percent.
The two diesel-powered ships, the PS 8 and PS 26, left Genoa on October 27,
1934, manned by probably 87 Italians commanded by officers of the Lloyd
Triestino Company and, learning the ropes, 18 Soviets. Capable of reaching
twenty knots and armed with twelve rifles to guard against pirates in the
eastern seas, the ships passed through the Suez Canal on November 2. The long
trip, in effect a shakedown cruise, required only a few repairs despite the
monsoon encountered between Singapore and Hongkong. Moscow was pleased with
its purchases. The Italian captains were equally pleased with the cruise and
with their treatment at the hands of the Soviets, who at the transfer
ceremonies saluted the Italian tricolor and shouted "long live" for both the
king and Duce.
Returning home on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the Italians spent two days in
Moscow, where again they were shown every courtesy. The entire group left for
Warsaw on the day following Christmas, the captains carrying a military report
for Rome. The Soviets armed the two escort vessels with three 100mm guns.
DIRIGIBLE CONSTRUCTION AND TRAINING
In the air as well as on the sea, the Italians assisted Moscow with military
technology, specifically in the construction of dirigibles. This program,
however, suffered several unfortunate setbacks. One ship they were helping the
Soviets to build was destroyed in an accident in 1933. The next year, engineer
Felice Trojani helped construct another dirigible, but it and a third ship,
along with the wooden hangar housing them, were destroyed by fire. A new
dirigible, substantially a copy of the Italian airship Italia, was then
constructed according to the plans of the famous arctic explorer, Umberto
Nobile. His extensive activities and projects were circumscribed, however, by
appendicitis, hospitalization, and a long vacation in Italy.
Nobile's contract with Moscow was due to end in February 1936. Eight months
before then, the head of Dirigiablestroi, the Soviet trust for airship
construction, tried to convince him to renew his contract. While interested,
Nobile had several reservations and made his acceptance contingent on
participation in an arctic expedition. Meanwhile, in a personal letter to
Mussolini, Nobile placed himself at the Duce's disposal. By November 1935, he
had decided not to stay. He wrote the Italian ambassador, "at this time [i.e.,
the war with Abyssinia] . . . it seems intolerable that I should serve a
foreign government rather than my own." In that same letter, Nobile asked for
the ambassador's help in case the Soviets, anxious for his expertise, decided
to keep him after the expiration of his contract. While his fears were perhaps
not unfounded, he got out without difficulty.
By that time, however, Soviet relations in all fields with Italy were
crumbling, buffeted first by the Italo-Abyssinian War and then all but
destroyed by the Spanish Civil War.
CONCLUSION
Looking back, this series of military visits, consultations, technical
collaborations, and military constructions palpably carried forward the
Italo-Soviet political rapprochement of 1933. Despite the lack of Soviet
documents revealing the deepest thoughts of the Kremlin's leaders, it is
reasonable to guess that Moscow valued these contacts especially for the
triple pressure they put on Berlin. Most important, they honed to a sharp edge
Rome's opposition to Nazi designs on Austria by implicitly opening up the
possibility of Soviet support—even military support—for Italy's defense of
that country. Next, these contacts reminded the German military establishment
and industrialists of the value of their own lost Rapallo-era cooperation with
the Soviets. By drawing closer to Italy, Moscow also was telling Berlin that
ideology need not get in the way of friendly relations. Frequently criticizing
Berlin for causing the breakdown in Soviet-German relations, Mussolini,
himself, tried to drive this point home to Hitler. And, finally, paralleled by
Franco-Soviet exchanges, the military contacts presumably were thought to be
useful in greasing the ways for Italo-French cooperation, which, together with
Italo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet collaboration, would put Germany in a vise to
squeeze Hitler to impotence or—even better—to force him to return to loyal
Rapallo-like cooperation.
As for Rome, Italy needed the military contracts to pay for its imports of
Soviet oil and timber, and in trying to balance its trade deficit, Rome had
little else that Moscow wanted. Politically, Italy had to find support against
Nazi encroachments on Austria. And further, Rome needed Paris, and the French
desire for Soviet support forced Rome to sublimate its rivalry with the USSR
in Slavic Southeast Europe.
Italy had a most important role to play in forging the incipient collective
security coalition designed to keep Germany in its place. Until 1936 or so, it
was the one power with both the will and the means to stop German expansionism
in its tracks through direct political and military intervention in Austria
against Anschluss. And it was only through Rome that its protégées, Austria
and Hungary, could be brought to cooperate with the French allies in East and
Southeast Europe—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Italy's
critical place in the anti-German coalition is easily demonstrated. Witness
only that the ramshackle structure did collapse in 1935 and 1936 following the
strains of the Italo-Abyssinian War when Rome withdrew itself from anti-German
cooperation.
APPENDIX
In late April, 1934 Attolico sent Rome a complete list of Italian military
contracts on the account of the Soviet government.
1) S. A. Ansaldo of Genoa was building, along destroyer lines, two coast
guard/escort vessels of 776 tons displacement and 76 meters in length. Endowed
with Tosi motors and costing 18,650,000 lire, the ships were to be consigned
about April or May. (These were the PS 8 and PS 26.)
2) Ansaldo also was building factories for the construction of complete motors
for cruisers. The firm was to supply technical collaboration as well to the
USSR for cruiser construction. These contracts were worth 34,000,000 lire.
3) Odero-Terni-Orlando of La Spezia was building 12 twin-barrel anti-aircraft
cannons.
4) Società S. Giorgio of Sestri had finished in March the consignment of 46
range finding devices of 4 meters at the base and detachable in 3 parts.
5) Officine Galileo of Florence was in the process of supplying 4 complete
fire control systems including search lights, range finders, sight mechanisms,
and gyrocompasses for 4 torpedo boat destroyers. Three of these already had
been delivered, and the 4th had passed its trials and was ready.
6) Officine Galileo also was supplying 15 attack periscopes for submarines, of
which 5 already had been sent, 4 had passed their tests, and the rest were 90
per cent completed.
7) Officine Galileo was supplying 14 range finders of which 10 were of 6
meters and 4 were of 8 meters. Some were undergoing testing and some were
being mounted.
8) Officine Galileo additionally was supplying 100 mirrors for 150mm
searchlights of which 30 had been sent and the others were being tested or
were still under construction.
9) Silurificio Italiano of Naples was in the course of consigning 50 torpedoes
of 533mm x 7.5 and 45 of 533mm x 7.27, as well as 2 3-tube torpedo launchers
of 533mm.
10) Silurificio Whitehead of Fiume was delivering 80 torpedoes of 533mm of
which 25 were as yet incomplete and 15 torpedoes of 450mm, none of which was
completed.
11) Ditta Isotta Fraschini of Milan was supplying spare parts for Asso 750
motors for 606,850.72 lire, plus 51 marine units of the type Asso 1000 MAD.
12) Ottico Meccanica Italiana of Rome and Aeronautica Macchi of Varese had
made offers of aeronautical material for Soviet aviation, but no concrete
orders had yet come to pass.
ENDNOTES
1. Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 3933/1552, 9/6/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS
b(usta) 15 f(oglio) 7.
2. Suvich circular telegram 985/C-R, 5/13/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b8 f2.
3. A courtesy call after the Soviet icebreaker Krasin had saved Umberto
Nobile and the survivors of the Italia airship, from June 8-10, 1929,
Balbo had led in dramatic style 35 seaplanes of the Royal Italian Air Force to
Odessa. S.I.A.I. ali nella storia (Florence: Edizioni Aeronautiche
italiane S.r.L., 1979), 17-18, 21-24; Moscow Embassy to Mussolini, telexpress
3208/1595, 7/31/33; Izvestia, July 27, 1933. Other Italian naval units
had visited Odessa in 1925. In September 1929, two Soviet destroyers, the
Frunze and Nezanozhny, had visited Naples while on an instructional
cruise in the Mediterranean. Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1930,
Charles N. Robinson and N. M. Ross, eds. (London: William Clowes and Sons,
Ltd., 1930), 48. A Soviet naval mission visited Italy in December 1930.
4. de Ferrari to the Naval Ministry 11/M; Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress
2519/1277, 6/6/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS, b8 f2; Suvich memorandum, colloquy with
Potemkin, 5/31/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b10 f1.
5. Suvich memorandum, colloquy with Potemkin, 8/7/33; Quaroni to Attolico,
telexpress 227487/158, 9/13/33; Suvich to Baistrocchi, note 224287/C, 8/12/33;
Sirianni to Suvich, letter, 8/17/33; Baistrocchi to Suvich, letter, 8/19/33;
Balbo to Suvich, letter 05596, 8/30/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b10 f1.
6. Pravda, Sept. 3, 1933; Izvestia, Sept. 3, 1933.
7. Izvestia, Sept. 10, 1933; Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress
03832/1842 bis., 9/11/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b10 f1.
8. Berardis to MAE, telexpress 4129/1983, 10/9/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b10 f1.
9. Quaroni to Attolico, telexpress 227487/158, 9/13/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b10
f1; Suvich to Baistrocchi, letter 224287/C, 8/12/33; Sirianni to Suvich,
letter, 8/17/33; Berardis to MAE, telexpress 03987/1925, 9/26/33; telegram
9905PR, 10/21/33; Suvich to Sirianni, phonegram 2981, 9/28/33; Potemkin to
MAE, note verbale 322, 10/14/33; Salerno Mele to MAE, telegram 9922PR,
10/22/33; Rossoni to MAE, telegram 9964PR, 10/23/33; Note for Suvich,
10/23/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b11 f4.
10. Baratono to MAE, telegrams 10238PR, 10/31/33; 10245, 10/31/33; 10285PR,
11/1/33; 10286PR, 11/1/33; 10331PR, 11/2/33; 10332, 11/2/33: MAE (Rome) AP
URSS b11 f4.
11. MAE Servizio Correspondenza Uff. 3 to Attolico, telexpress 329090,
11/27/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b11 f2.
12. Puppini to MAE, memorandum 12/9/33; Potemkin to MAE, note verbale,
12/19/33; MAE to Puppini, telexpress 200880, 1/11/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b11
f4.
13. Pravda, Nov. 1, 1933; Izvestia, Nov. 2, 4, 1933; Moscow
Embassy to MAE, telexpresses 3484/2082, 11/7/33, 4528/2104, 11/14/33: MAE
(Rome) AP URSS b11 f1. TASS from Rome also recounted the reception given at
the Soviet embassy on the occasion of the 16th anniversary of the Revolution.
Izvestia, Nov. 10, 1933; Moscow Embassy to MAE, telexpress 4528/2104,
11/14/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b11 f1.
14. The Times, Oct. 31; Nov. 3, 1933; Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini: A
Biography (New York: Knopf, 1982), 182.
15. Attolico to Mussolini, telexpresses 1477/573, 4/19/34; 2762/1161, 7/3/34;
2792/1169, 7/4/34; Aloisi to Ministero della Guerra, 214792/134, 5/7/34;
Ministero della Guerra to MAE, notes 9903, 5/11/34; 14972, 7/9/34; Quaroni to
Attolico, telexpress 215604/68, 5/15/34; Baratono to MAE, note 12424, 7/9/34;
telegrams 7226PR, 7/18/34; 7296PR, 7/20/34; Suvich to Ministero della Guerra,
telexpress 5483, 7/11/34; MAE to Ministero della Guerra, telegram 7262,
7/11/34; Ministero della Guerra to Suvich, promemorial, 8/13/34: MAE (Rome) AP
URSS b15 f5; Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 2297/1005, 6/7/34: MAE (Rome)
AP URSS b14 f1; The Times, July 13, 1934.
16. Attolico to Mussolini, telegrams 6765PR, 7/4/34; 7722PR, 8/2/34; 7827PR,
8/5/34; telexpress 3472/1345, 8/2/34; Valle to MAE, telegram 03770, 7/9/34;
Suvich to Balbo, telegram 7116PR, 7/9/34; Aloisi to Balbo, telegram 7971PR,
7/31/34; Potemkin to Mussolini, letter 003, nd: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f14;
Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 3562/1372, 8/9/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b14
f8.
17. Potemkin had delayed his vacation with the hope of personally presenting
the Soviet delegation to Mussolini, who, "with his usual cordiality," had
agreed. DVP, 17: 248.
18. Izvestia, Aug. 15, 16, 17, 18, 1934; Pravda, Aug. 15, 16,
17, 18, 1934; Moscow embassy to Mussolini, telexpress 3771/1478, 8/23/34: MAE
(Rome) AP URSS b15 f2.
19. Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 3580/1381, 8/9/34; MAEb to Ministero
della Guerra, telexpress 227509/262, 8/24/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f6;
Attolico to Mussolini, telexpresses 3933/1552, 9/6/34; 4030/1593, 9/13/34;
Buti to Suvich, note, 8/23/34; Aloisi to MAE, telegram 9045PR, 8/29/34; Aloisi
to Attolico, telegram 9205PR/107, 9/2/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f7.
20. Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 3933/1552, 9/6/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS
b15 f7.
21. Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow to MAE, telexpress 3668/1425, 8/15/35; Arone
to MAE (Rome), telexpress 4358/1662, 9/26/35: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b17 f2.
22. William H. Garzke Jr. and Robert O. Dulin Jr., Battleships; Allied
Battleships in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 308;
Siegfried Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy, trans. M. W. Henley
(Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1970), 22, 24; Jurg Meister, The
Soviet Navy 1, Navies of the Second World War (London: Macdonald, 1971),
34-35; Jurg Meister, Soviet Warships of the Second World War (New York:
Arco Publishing Co., 1977), 20-21.
23. In United States Naval Institute Proceedings, see: "Where Italy
Leads," (Sept. 1933): 1361; "Italy: Brief Notes," (Nov. 1933): 1650; "Italy:
Italian Building," (Jan. 1934): 128-29; "Italy: Italy Sees Menace," (Mar.
1934): 427; "Italy: New Battleships for Italy," (Sept. 1934): 1316-17; "Italy:
Mussolini Speaks," (Aug. 1934): 1163; "Italy: Various Notes," (Dec. 1934):
1779; "Italy: Various Notes," 61 (Feb. 1935): 279; "Italy: Cruiser
Performance," (Aug. 1933 or 1935): 1176-77; "Italy: Current Building Program,"
(Dec. 1935): 1866. In "Italy: Italy Defies France," (Aug. 1934): 1163,
United States Naval Institute Proceedings reported that the Chicago
Tribune, June 20, 1934, claimed that Italy wished to fortify her navy with
battleships because of her alarm over the possibilities of a Franco-Soviet
alliance which would require a strong naval presence not only in the Eastern
Mediterranean, but also in the Black Sea.
24. Garzke and Dulin, Battleships, 315.
25. Suvich to Attolico, telexpress 230320/C, 10/9/33, with attachment,
Potemkin to Suvich, promemorial, 8/14/33; Suvich to Sirianni, telexpress
229482, 9/13/33; Attolico to Mussolini, telegrams 1384PR, 2/14/34; 2878PR,
3/24/34; 2883PR, 3/24/34; 2885PR, 3/24/34; Attolico to Mussolini, telexpresses
3958/1913, 9/23/33; 540/259, 2/14/34; 1193/531, 3/28/34; 4034PR, 4/25/34;
1841/808, 5/10/34; 1957/861, 5/17/34; 1969/866, 5/17/34; Sirianni to
Consulenza Tecnica all'URSS, note 34814, 9/24/33; Sirianni to MAE, note 34814,
9/29/33; Berardis to MAE, telexpress 4245/2033, 10/22/33, 10/22/33; MAE to
Sirianni, telexpress 232974/C, 11/6/33; MAE to Ministero delle Corporazioni,
telexpress 205740/C, 2/18/34; Ministero delle Corporazioni to Attolico, note
7083, 3/3/34; Undersecretary of State to MAE, Aff. Pol. Uff. 4, note, 3/28/34;
Aloisi to Attolico, telegram 3666/44, 4/15/34; Ansaldo to MAE, note, 5/1/34;
Suvich to Attolico, telegram 4334PR/52, 5/3/34; MAE to Sirianni, telexpress
216619/C, 5/22/34; Voroshilov to Attolico, letter, 5/16/34; Suvich to Sirianni,
telexpress 217309, 5/28/34; Sirianni to Suvich, note B4177, 6/4/34: MAE (Rome)
AP URSS b17 f3; Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 1340/616, 3/20/33; Colloquy
with Potemkin, 3/29/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b8 f1; Moscow Embassy to MAE,
telexpress 3381/1630, 8/9/33; Suvich to Ministero della Marina-Gabinetto,
telexpress 227432, 9/13/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b11 f4.
26. For all military construction contracts as of the spring of 1934, See
Appendix. For additional documentation for contracts by various firms, see
Consul at Leningrad to MAE, telexpress 573/87, 10/24/34; MAE DGAE Uff. 1 to
DGAP, note 228468/1769, 9/1/34; Quaroni to DGAE Uff. 1, note 229186/1816,
9/8/34: MAE (Rome) AP USSR b17 f3; MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f4.
27. Puppini to MAE (Rome), note 7049, 7/13/34; MAE to Sirianni, telexpress
223997/296, 7/21/34; MAE to Giannini, note 224939/1561, 7/31/34; Potemkin,
note verbale 003, 7/23/34; MAE to Sirianni, n.d.; Campioni to MAE, notes
43846, 7/25/34; 438 UC, 7/25/34; 472, 8/4/34; Suvich to Sirianni, telexpress
224995/317, 7/31/34; Suvich to Puppini, telexpress 226923/900; letter
235069/1142, 11/3/34; Puppini to Mussolini, letter, 10/25/34: MAE (Rome) AP
URSS b17 f3.
28. Consul at Port Said to MAE, telexpress 3508/382, 11/2/34; Puppini to
Suvich, letter, 11/7/34; Campioni to MAE, note 11/16/34; Consul at Colombo,
Ceylon to MAE, 11/22/34; Bianconi to Mussolini, letter, 1/3/35: MAE (Rome) AP
URSS b17 f3; Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 5602/2149, 12/27/34: MAE (Rome)
AP URSS b18 f10; Puppini to MAE, note 328, 2/2/35: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b18 f12.
29. Other vessels of the same pattern perhaps were built in Soviet yards. The
three Albatross-class ships, whose presence in the Black Sea was
reported but whose existence was never confirmed, may have been of this type.
Not until 1938 did the Soviets independently develop a class of escorts, the
Iastreb-class, three of which were completed during the war. In
dimensions and gun armament they resembled the Italian-built class, but they
proved significantly faster and their torpedo armament was more like that of
older destroyers and torpedo boats. Breyer, Guide, 100; Meister,
Soviet Warships, 144; John Cambell, Naval Weapons of World War Two
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985), 363. The Soviets also inquired for
help in building a salvage vessel to raise sunken ships. Consul at Leningrad
to MAE, telexpress 595/92, 11/6/34; Quaroni to Puppini, telexpress
237078/1200, 11/21/34; Puppini to MAE, note, 11/29/34; Quaroni to Consul at
Leningrad, telexpress 238563/2, 12/4/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f4.
30. Attolico to Mussolini, telexpresses 2016/995, 5/21/33; 2729/1365, 6/19/33;
3534/1714, 8/21/33; 03942/1886, 9/25/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b11 f11.
31. Attolico to Balbo, telexpress 524/225, 2/14/34; Balbo, note 00992,
2/23/34; Attolico to Mussolini, telexpresses 2496/1087, 6/19/34; 3714/1435,
8/21/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f14.
32. Berardis to MAE, telexpress 4958/1894, 11/13/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15
f4. For Nobile's health problems, see MAE (Rome) AP URSS b15 f9. This is the
same Umberto Nobile who had been dramatically rescued by the Soviet icebreaker
Krasin in the arctic wreckage of the Italia airship. This
incident was depicted in the film, The Red Tent, starring Sean Connery
and Albert Finney.
33. Nobile to Mussolini, letter, 8/11/35, with attachment: MAE (Rome) AP URSS
b22 f13.
34. Nobile to Arone, letter, 11/27/35: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b22 f13.
35. On January 13, 1934, e.g., at a farewell dinner given by the Red Army for
the departing Italian military attaché, de Ferrari, Yegorov told the German
military attaché that he desired a return to military cooperation. To put an
edge on his wish, he also intimated that Moscow was considering equipping
Soviet submarines with Italian torpedoes. DGFP, C, 2: 191.
36. For one example of Soviet appreciation for Rome's intercession in Berlin,
see Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 1640/758, 4/10/33: MAE (Rome) AP URSS
b10 f1.
37. Vasilii Ivanovich Achkasov, A. B. Basov, N. V. Bol'shakov, G. M. Gel'fond,
R. N. Mordvinov, and A. I. Sumin, eds., Voevoi put' sovetskogo
voenno-morskogo flota (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony
SSSR, 1974), 135; Eric Morris, The Russian Navy: Myth and Reality (New
York: Stein and Day, 1977), 27 n.12.
38. For one Soviet propagandist's appreciative description of the role Rome
played in putting down the Nazi putsch of July 25, 1934 in Austria, see Ernst
Henri (pseudo.), Hitler Over Russia? The Coming Fight Between the Fascist
and Socialist Armies, Michael Davidson, trans. (London: J. M. Dent & Sons,
Ltd., 1936), 38-53, 82-120. Henri believed that an Italo-German war almost had
broken out; further, under Hitler's aegis, there was being formed in the
mid-thirties in Central and East Europe, a bloc of fascist states whose object
was to conquer the USSR.
39. Attolico to Mussolini, telexpress 1566/706, 4/25/34: MAE (Rome) AP URSS
b15 f4.
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